An experimental investigation of violations of transitivity in choice under uncertainty

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Abstract Several models of decision-making imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. Our experiments explored whether people show patterns of intransitivity predicted by regret theory and majority rule. To distinguish "true" violations from those produced by "error," a model was fit in which each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of true preferences that need not be transitive. Error rate for a choice is estimated from preference reversals between repeated presentations of that same choice. Our results showed that very few people repeated intransitive patterns. We can retain the hypothesis that transitivity best describes the data of the vast majority of participants.

Keywords Choice · Decision making · Errors · Regret theory · Transitivity

JEL classification C91 · D81

The most popular theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty assume that people behave as if they compute values (or "utilities") for the alternatives and choose (or at least, tend to choose) the alternative with the highest computed value. This class of models includes expected utility theory, cumulative prospect theory, prospective reference theory (PRT), transfer of attention exchange (TAX), gains decomposition utility and many others (Luce 2000; Marley and Luce 2005; Starmer 2000; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wu et al. 2004; Viscusi 1989). Although these models can be compared by means of special experiments testing properties that

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distinguish them (Birnbaum 1999, 2005a, b; Camerer 1989, 1992; Harless and Camerer 1994; Hey and Orme 1994), they all share in common the property of transitivity.

Transitivity is the property that if a person prefers alternative A to B, and B to C, then that person should prefer A to C. If a person systematically violates this property, it should be possible to turn that person into a "money pump" if the person were willing to pay a little to get A rather than B, something to get B rather than C, something to get C rather than A and so on, ad infinitum. Most theoreticians, but not all (Fishburn 1991; 1992; Bordley and Hazen 1991; Anand 1987), conclude that it would not be rational to violate transitivity.

Despite such seemingly "irrational" implications of violating transitivity, some descriptive theories imply that people can in certain circumstances be induced to violate it. Models that violate transitivity include the lexicographic semi-order (Tversky 1969), the additive difference model [including regret theory of Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) as well as Fishburn's (1982) Skew-symmetric bilinear utility], Bordley's (1992) expectations-based Bayesian variant of Viscusi's PRT model, the stochastic difference model (González-Vallejo 2002), the priority heuristic model (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig 2006), the similarity model (Leland 1994, 1998; Rubinstein 1988), context-dependent model of the gambling effect (Bleichrodt and Schmidt 2002) and context- and reference-dependent utility (Bleichrodt and Schmidt 2005).

If people systematically violate transitivity, it means that the first class of models must be either rejected or revised if those models hope to describe human behavior. A number of previous studies attempted to test transitivity (Birnbaum et al. 1999; Loomes et al. 1989, 1991; Loomes and Taylor 1992; Humphrey 2001; Starmer 1999; Starmer and Sugden 1998; Tversky 1969). However, these studies remain controversial; there is not yet consensus that there are situations that produce substantial violations of transitivity (Luce 2000; Iverson and Falmagne 1985; Iverson et al. 2006; Regenwetter and Stober 2006, Sopher and Gigliotti 1993; Stevenson et al. 1991). Among others, a problem that has frustrated previous research has been the issue of deciding whether an observed pattern represents "true violations" of transitivity or might be due instead to "random errors."

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test patterns of intransitivity that are predicted by two models (i.e. regret theory and majority rule), using an "error" model that has the promise to be neutral with respect to the issue of transitivity and which seems plausible as a description of repeated choices. A second feature of our experimental design is that it does not confound event-splitting effects (violations of coalescing) with the tests of transitivity. If violations persist when these factors are controlled, models that predicted those violations gain credibility. Otherwise, the absence of violations when these factors are controlled would be consistent with theories that assume transitivity. Note that our study is only devoted to the actual behavior of subjects; we do not consider whether violations of transitivity can be rational or not.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes predictions of regret theory and majority rule with respect to transitivity and reviews earlier experimental studies. Previous studies reported that intransitive cycles predicted by regret theory were observed with significantly higher frequencies than

the opposite cycles. However, this evidence can also be explained by transitive preferences if errors are taken into account in an appropriate way. Section 2 presents the error model. In this model we allow for different error rates in different choices. Our model is neutral with respect to the issue of transitivity; that is, we do not simply add an error term to a transitive model like expected utility since this would imply that transitivity must hold in the absence of errors. In our model true preferences are allowed to be intransitive. Design and results of experiments are reported in Sections 3 and 4. In our design each choice is presented twice to each person, as we use the proportion of preference reversals between replications of the same choice to estimate the error rate for that choice. Section 5 concludes that despite powerful tests, we find little evidence of systematic violation of transitivity. When data are analyzed using this error model, we find little evidence to refute the hypothesis that nearly everyone had a transitive preference order.

1 Integrative contrast models: regret theory and majority rule

The decision-maker chooses between alternatives, A and B, which yield different consequences depending on the state of the world. Assume there are n mutually exclusive and exhaustive states, E_i, and that consequences may be contingent on both the choice and the state of the world. Let $A=(E_1, a_1; E_2, a_2;..;E_n, a_n)$ and $B=(E_1, b_1; E_2, b_2;..;E_n, b_n)$ represent the contingency between E_i and the consequences for the alternatives. If B were chosen, the consequence under E_i would be b_i, instead of a_i. Regret theory and majority rule are both special cases of an integrative contrast model, which can be written as follows:

$$A \succ B \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi(E_i)\psi(a_i, b_i) > 0 \tag{1}$$

Where $A \succ B$ denotes A is preferred to B, where a_i and b_i are the consequences of A and B for state of the world E_i, $\phi(E_i)$ is the subjective probability of this state of the world E_i, and ψ maps pairs of consequences (psychological contrasts between a_i and b_i for a given state of the world) into psychological preferences. It is assumed that $\psi(a, b)=-\psi(b, a)$ and $\psi(a, b)=0 \Leftrightarrow a=b$. When probabilities are known, it is assumed that $\phi(E_i)=p_i$, where p_i is the probability of E_i. See Fishburn (1982, 1991) for analysis of closely related nontransitive representations.

According to *regret theory* (Loomes and Sugden 1982; Bell 1982), people compare the prizes for each state of the world and make choices in order to minimize regret. It is assumed that regrets are particularly large for large contrasts in consequences. For all $a \succ b \succ c$, it is assumed that $\psi(a, c) > \psi(a, b) + \psi(b, c)$. This assumption is called "regret aversion."

The following special case of regret theory can be used to illustrate its implications:

$$\phi(E_i)\psi(a_i, b_i) = p_i(x_i - y_i)^3 \tag{2}$$

where p_i is the probability that the corresponding state of the world occurs; x_i and y_i are the cash payoffs of choosing A and B in state of the world, E_i, respectively. Note

that in this case, large differences in payoff produce extra large regrets (i.e. the regret function is convex), as proposed by regret theory. Note as well that the cubic function retains the signs (directions) of the regrets.

Consider the first three choices in Table 1 (Choices 11, 5, and 13). These choices were defined with respect to an urn containing 100 tickets numbered from #1 to #100, which were otherwise identical, from which one ticket would be drawn randomly to determine the prize. The first gamble of the first row (Choice 11) indicates that if the ticket drawn were #1 to #30, the prize is $3, #31–60, the prize is $3, and if it is #61–100, the prize is $10. For the second alternative, these ticket ranges yield prizes of $1, $7.50, and $7.50, respectively. Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden (1991) reported that these choices produced the greatest percentage of intransitive cycles (28%, see p. 437). In addition, this set was chosen because the observed incidence of this intransitive cycle exceeded the frequency of the most common transitive preference pattern that differed from it by only one choice. According to Eqs. 1 and 2, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i(x_i - y_i)^3 = -18.7$, so $B \succ A$;

Table 1 Tests of transitivity used in Studies 1 and 2

Choice				Study 1 n=314	Study 2 n=103	
Type	No.	First gamble	Second gamble	Series I	Series I	Series II
AB	11	40 to win 10 30 to win 3 30 to win 3	40 to win 7.5 30 to win 7.5 30 to win 1	34	36	90
BC	5	40 to win 7.5 30 to win 7.5 30 to win 1	40 to win 5 30 to win 5 30 to win 5	64	52	46
CA	13	40 to win 5 30 to win 5 30 to win 5	40 to win 10 30 to win 3 30 to win 3	47	56	20
BA	9	40 to win 7.5 30 to win 7.5 30 to win 1	40 to win 10 30 to win 3 30 to win 3	66	59	10
CB	15	40 to win 5 30 to win 5 30 to win 5	40 to win 7.5 30 to win 7.5 30 to win 1	41	49	53
AC	7	40 to win 10 30 to win 3 30 to win 3	40 to win 5 30 to win 5 30 to win 5	55	44	79

In Series I, A=($10, 0.4; $3, 0.3; $3, 0.3), B=($7.5,0.4; $7.5,0.3; $1,0.3), C=($5, 0.4; $5, 0.3; $5, 0.3). In Series II, A=($18, 0.3; $0, 0.3; $0, 0.4), B=($8, 0.3; $8, 0.3; $0, 0.4), and C=($4, 0.3; $4, 0.3; $4, 0.4). Entries show the percentages who chose the second gamble in each choice. Choices were defined with respect to an urn containing 100 numbered tickets that were otherwise identical, from which one would be drawn blindly and randomly to determine the prize.

The notation "30 to win 3" in the first alternative of Choice 11 means that tickets #1–30 would win $3 if the person chose the first gamble (prize would be $1 for the same tickets if the person chose the second gamble).

$\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i(x_i - y_i)^3 = -8.3$, so $C \succ B$; however, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i(x_i - y_i)^3 = 45.2$, so $A \succ C$, violating transitivity. This special case model of regret thus reproduces the violation of transitivity in this case.

The *majority rule model* (sometimes called the *most probable winner* model) is also a special case of Eq. 1 in which the contrast functions are as follows:

$$\psi(a_i, b_i) = \begin{vmatrix} 1, & a_i \succ b_i \\ 0, & a_i = b_i \\ -1, & a_i \prec b_i \end{vmatrix} \tag{3}$$

According to this model applied to the first three choices of Table 1, people should prefer A to B because it has higher values on two of the three dimensions. Similarly, they should prefer B to C, and C to A, for the same reasons. Thus, majority rule also predicts violations of transitivity, but of the opposite pattern from that predicted by regret theory. [In this case, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i\psi(a_i, b_i) = 0.4$, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i\psi(b_i, c_i) = 0.4$, yet $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i\psi(a_i, c_i) = -0.2$; therefore, $A \succ B$, $B \succ C$, but $C \succ A$.]

A problem in previous empirical tests of regret theory is that certain confounds were present in those studies (Humphrey 2001; Starmer and Sugden 1998). Probably the most important problem was that different forms of the gambles were used in different choices. A and B were presented for comparison as three-branch gambles: A=($10, 0.4; $3, 0.3; $3, 0.3), B=($7.5, 0.4; $7.5, 0.3; $1, 0.3). However, the so-called choice between B and C was actually presented in a form in which the two upper branches of B and C were coalesced, creating two new gambles, B'=($7.5, 0.7; $1, 0.3), C'=($5, 0.7; $5, 0.3). The choice between C=($5, 0.4; $5, 0.3; $5, 0.3) and A was presented with the two lower branches coalesced, creating two other new gambles, C'' and A'' where C''=($5, 0.4; $5, 0.6), and A''=($10, 0.4; $3, 0.6). According to the transitive TAX model, with parameters taken from previous data (see Birnbaum and Navarrete 1998, p. 57), splitting and coalescing of branches could account for the apparent violations of transitivity. According to this TAX model we have $U(A)$=4.33, $U(B)$=5.33; $U(C)$=5.00; $U(B')$=3.79; $U(C')$=5.00, $U(A'')$=5.01; $U(C'')$=5.00. Thus, this TAX model implies that, $A \prec B$, $B' \prec C'$ and $C'' \prec A''$, so it reproduces the results that were called evidence of intransitivity with the assumption that the results are due instead to violations of coalescing.

In this paper, we keep all gambles in the same three-branch form to avoid this confound with coalescing. Starmer and Sugden (1998) and Humphrey (2001) recognized this confound and controlled for it by presenting choices in fully split forms or by using a different format for display ("strip") in which gambles were presented in fully coalesced form. But those articles had a second problem; namely, they used asymmetry of different types of intransitivity as evidence of intransitivity. As we show in the next section, such asymmetry is entirely compatible with an error model in which people make occasional "errors" in determining or reporting their preferences, even if they are truly transitive.

2 Error model

In a study with three choices, AB, BC, and CA (as in Table 1), there are eight possible outcomes: 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, and 111, where 0 denotes

choice of the first gamble, and 1 denotes choice of the second gamble. The pattern, 110 denotes preference for the second gamble in the first two choices and preference for the first gamble in the third (i.e., $A \prec B$, $B \prec C$, and $C \succ A$). The pattern, 000, represents the intransitive cycle, $A \succ B$, $B \succ C$, and $C \succ A$, and 111 is its reverse cycle, $A \prec B$, $B \prec C$, and $C \prec A$, respectively. Suppose a person has the true pattern, 110, but sometimes makes random "errors" in discovering or reporting her preferences. If so, it takes only one error to produce the 111, but it takes two errors to produce the intransitive pattern, 000.

In the model of Sopher and Gigliotti (1993), the probability that a person exhibits intransitive choices 111 and has the true preference pattern, 110, is given as follows:

$$P(111 \cap 110) = p_{110}(1 - e_1)(1 - e_2)e_3, \tag{4}$$

where $P(111 \cap 110)$ is the probability that a person shows the observed intransitive pattern 111 and has the true pattern 110, p_{110} is the probability of the true pattern 110, and, e_1, e_2 and e_3 are the probabilities of making errors on the AB, BC, and CA choices, respectively. It is assumed that the errors are independent and that $0 < e_i < 1/2$. To show this pattern of observed preferences, this person made no errors on the first two choices and made an error in the third choice. In this model, the probability of showing a given data pattern is the sum of eight terms representing the eight possible true patterns and the probability of showing a given data pattern given each true pattern.

For example, the probability of showing the 111 data pattern is given as follows:

$$P(111) = p_{000}e_1e_2e_3 + p_{001}e_1e_2(1 - e_3) + \ldots + p_{111}(1 - e_1)(1 - e_2)(1 - e_3) \tag{5}$$

There are eight equations including Eq. 5 for the eight possible observed data patterns. One can fit this model to the observed frequencies of these patterns. The predicted frequencies are given by $\widehat{f_i} = n\widehat{P}(i)$, where n is the number of participants, and $i = 000, 001, \ldots, 111$. Parameters are estimated to minimize $\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{8} \left(f_i - \widehat{f_i}\right)^2 / \widehat{f_i}$. However, there are only seven degrees of freedom in the eight observed frequencies (since they sum to the number of participants), and there are three error terms and seven parameters representing the eight probabilities, p_{000}, p_{001}, p_{010}, ..., (which sum to 1). This model therefore has more parameters than there are degrees of freedom in the data. Unless we make some arbitrary assumptions, or increase the degrees of freedom in the data, this model is under-determined.

Consider the observed frequencies ("data") in Table 2 representing 200 participants who made three choices. These data are from Loomes et al. (1991, p. 437, Table 4, Triple 4). In order to simplify the model, we might assume that the error rates are all equal (as is done by Harless and Camerer 1994), in which case we can fit the data perfectly with the assumption that 23% of the participants were intransitive, with the pattern 111. We could also fit the data with the assumption that $p_{000} = p_{111} = 0$ (that everyone is transitive), if we allow unequal errors $\widehat{e}_1 = 0.01$, $\widehat{e}_2 = 0.09$, and $\widehat{e}_3 = 0.31$, as in Sopher and Gigliotti (1993). Both of these models correctly predict that 46 people show the 111 data pattern and that no one shows the opposite pattern. Finally, note that when we attempt to fit the transitive model with equal errors, the data no longer fit very well. This means that we have an intransitive model if we want to fit these data with equal errors whereas a transitive model fits

Table 2 Fit of three models to frequencies of response patterns in a test of transitivity

Response pattern	Data	Intransitive, equal errors		Transitive, unequal errors		Transitive, equal errors	
		$\widehat{f}$	$\widehat{p}$	$\widehat{f}$	$\widehat{p}$	$\widehat{f}$	$\widehat{p}$
000	0	0.0	0.00	0.8	(0)	4.5	(0)
001	2	2.0	0.00	1.5	0.00	4.3	0.00
010	8	8.0	0.00	7.9	0.00	21.6	0.00
011	16	16.0	0.08	16.0	0.13	15.2	0.10
100	18	18.0	0.06	18.0	0.06	20.9	0.00
101	10	10.0	0.04	9.9	0.02	11.3	0.06
110	100	100.0	0.59	99.9	0.79	99.1	0.84
111	46	46.0	0.23	46.0	(0)	23.0	(0)
Chi-Square		0.0		0.76		753.4	

Data are from Loomes et al. 1991, p. 437, Table IV, triple 4. To distinguish these models, we need an independent way to estimate the error rates. Parameters in parentheses are fixed. Intransitive with equal errors, the error rate was estimated to be zero; for the transitive solution with equal errors, $\widehat{e}=0.16$; in the transitive solution with unequal errors, $\widehat{e}_1=0.01$, $\widehat{e}_2=0.09$, and $\widehat{e}_3=0.31$

well only if we allow unequal errors. Thus, if we hope to answer the question of transitivity, we need a way to estimate the error rates that is independent of arbitrary assumptions such as that transitivity holds or that all error rates are equal.

The error theory of Hey and Orme (1994) assumes an additive error component on a metric dimension, as is assumed in models of Thurstone (1927), Luce (1959, 1994), Busemeyer and Townsend (1993), and others. These models assume perfect transitivity in the absence of error and assume that the probability of errors will be related to the distance on an underlying, strongly transitive continuum. If we want to test transitivity rather than assume it, however, we cannot use these transitive error models as the framework of analysis.

An approach that is neutral with respect to the issue of transitivity has been suggested by Birnbaum (2004) and applied by Birnbaum and Gutierrez (2007) in testing predicted violations of transitivity that are predicted by lexicographic semiorders and reported by Tversky (1969). This approach uses preference reversals with repeated presentations of the same choices to estimate the errors. Assume that each person has a "true" preference for each choice, and that each choice can have a different "error" rate. Suppose we present the choice between A and B twice. The probability that a person will choose A the first time and B the second time is given as follows:

$$P(AB) = pe_1(1-e_1) + (1-p)(1-e_1)e_1 = e_1(1-e_1), \qquad (6)$$

where p is the "true" probability of preferring B and e_1 is the error rate for the AB choice. Similarly, the probability of choosing B the first time and choosing A on the second replication is also $e_1(1-e_1)$. There are four frequencies (with three degrees of freedom, AA, AB, BA, BB) that can be fit by two parameters (p and e_1), leaving one degree of freedom to test the model. The error rates for the BC and CA choices can be estimated in the same way. Use of replications thus provides a neutral way to estimate error terms.

In addition to providing an independent standard for evaluating transitivity, the use of replications also places greater constraint on the estimation of the "true"

probabilities of the sequences. In addition to counting the number of times that each person shows a given pattern on one presentation of the three choices, we can also count the number of times that each person repeats the same pattern on both replications. Whereas there are just eight response patterns in an experiment with three choices, there are 64 response patterns when three choices are replicated twice. In sum, use of replications increases the degrees of freedom in the data without adding any new parameters.

3 Experimental design

Study 1 was conducted with 314 undergraduates enrolled in lower division psychology at California State University at Fullerton (USA). Gambles were described in terms of a container holding 100 tickets numbered from #1 to #100, from which one would be chosen at random to determine the prize. The relationship between tickets and prizes was displayed in matrix format, as shown in Fig. 1, which defines payoffs for states of the world in three of the choices used (#4, #5, and #6). Participants viewed choices via browsers and clicked the button beside the gamble they would rather play. They were informed that at the end of the study, ten people would be chosen randomly who would receive the prize of one of their chosen gambles.

There were 15 choices in the study. The first three were choices between two-branch gambles, and served as a warm-up. There were two replications of three choices each for the tests of transitivity. Position of the two gambles in each pair was counterbalanced between the two replications (Table 1). The difference between Choices 11 and 13, for example, is first or second position of the gambles in the choice. These six choices were ordered randomly and alternated with six filler trials. In Series I, $A=(\$10, 0.4; \$3, 0.3; \$3, 0.3)$, $B=(\$7.5, 0.4; \$7.5, 0.3; \$1, 0.3)$, $C=(\$5, 0.4; \$5, 0.3; \$5, 0.3)$

Subjects were tested either in labs containing Internet-connected computers or via the Internet at times and using computers of participants' own choosing. They


Fig. 1 Appearance of three choices in the browser (Study 1). All gambles were presented as three branch gambles using states of the world, matrix format that displayed consequences for both alternatives of drawing each numbered ticket from an urn. There were always 100 tickets in the urn. In Study 2, materials were printed on paper and participants marked their preferred choices in pencil

participated as one option toward an assignment in lower division psychology. Of these, 60.5% were female and 92% were 21 years of age or less. Complete materials can be examined at the following URL: http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/decisions/Loomes_table.htm

Study 2 was conducted at the University of Hannover (Germany) with 103 undergraduate economics and management students. Format of gambles and choices were the same as in Study 1, except the materials were printed on paper and presented in a classroom setting. Participants marked their choices in pencil and received a flat payment of 5 Euros. There were 15 choices, including the six choices used in Study 1 (Table 1), three filler choices, plus a second series of six choices to test transitivity. In Series II, A=($18, 0.3; $0, 0.3; $0, 0.4), B=($8, 0.3; $8, 0.3; $0, 0.4), and C=($4, 0.3; $4, 0.3; $4, 0.4). Starmer and Sugden (1998) concluded that Series II led to frequent violations of transitivity, controlled for event splitting.

4 Results

The percentages choosing the second gamble in each choice are displayed in Table 1. The observed frequencies for response patterns of Series I of both studies are presented in the left and center portion of Table 3. Results from Starmer and Sugden (1998) are included for comparison. Whereas Starmer and Sugden (1998) reported 20% showing the intransitive pattern 111, we found only 8% and 7% who showed this pattern on Choices #11, 5, and 13 and on #9, 15, and 7 of Study 1, respectively; and only 0.6% showed this pattern on both repetitions. Figures for the intransitive pattern of majority rule, 000, are similar, with just four out of 313 showing this pattern of intransitivity on both replications.

In Study 2, the intransitive pattern, 111, was observed with relative frequencies of 6% (#11, 5, and 13), 6% (# 9, 15, and 7), and 3% (both repetitions). In the choices of Series II (Study 2), shown in the right-most portion of Table 3, the same intransitive pattern is observed even less often, i.e. 3% (#6, 10, 14), 3% (#4, 12, 8), and 2%

Table 3 Response patterns for Series I and II (both studies)

Pattern	Study 1, series I				Study 2, series I			Study 2, series II			
	Starmer and Sugden (1998)	#11, 5, 13	#9, 15, 7	Both	#11, 5, 13	#9, 15, 7	Both	Starmer and Sugden (1998)	#6, 10, 14	#4, 12, 8	Both
000	6	20	27	4	7	6	2	3	2	0	0
001	7	45	48	27	22	20	15	5	5	6	5
010	15	90	89	55	16	16	11	4	2	3	1
011	16	53	43	12	21	19	11	2	1	1	1
100	8	23	27	10	11	11	5	9	37	37	31
101	7	25	28	10	9	13	5	12	12	12	9
110	14	32	29	9	11	12	5	45	41	41	37
111	17	25	22	2	6	6	3	10	3	3	2
Total	90	313	313	129	103	103	57	90	103	103	86

Totals sum to 313 due to a skipped item. Patterns for #9, 15, and 7 have been reflected to correct for counterbalanced position, as have Responses to #4, 12, and 8. Regret theory implies the 111 pattern, and majority rule implies the 000 pattern of violations of transitivity

Table 4 Preference reversals between repetitions (Study 1)

Choice	Response combinations				χ^2 (1) Independence	TRUE + ERROR estimates		χ^2 (1) True and error
XY	XX	XY	YX	YY		$\widehat{p}$	$\widehat{e}$	
AB	171	37	36	69	71.56	0.277	0.135	0.01
BC	79	34	51	150	59.14	0.667	0.164	3.38
CA	132	34	41	107	84.91	0.445	0.139	0.65

Totals do not always sum to the number of participants (314) due to skipped items
XY and YX are preference reversals

(both repetitions), compared to 11% in Starmer and Sugden (1998). The rates of violations of intransitivity for the pattern 000 were also quite small.

Tables 4 and 5 show how error rates in each choice are estimated from preference reversals between repetitions of the same choices. The three rows in Table 4 show responses to choices between A and B, B and C, and C and A, respectively. The Chi-Square test of independence assesses whether the probability of choice combinations can be represented by the product of probabilities for individual choices. These tests are all significant, clearly violating independence. The Chi-Square tests of the true and error model (shown in the last columns, also with one degrees of freedom) are all nonsignificant, indicating that the true and error model can be retained for these data.

The error rates are estimated from preference reversals between repeated presentations of the same choice with position of the gambles reversed. In Study 1, these were estimated to be 0.13, 0.16, and 0.14 for the three choices (AB, BC, CA), respectively. In Study 2, the corresponding values were 0.08, 0.14, and 0.13 for the first set of gambles and 0.02, 0.04, and 0.05 for the second set (Table 2). Recall that these estimates of error rates assume nothing about transitivity.

There are 64 possible data patterns in each test of transitivity. But many of these have small frequencies; therefore, the data are partitioned into the number who show each of the eight patterns on both replicates and the eight average frequencies of showing each pattern on either the first or second replicate but not both. The sum of these 16 frequencies adds to the number of participants, leaving 15 degrees of freedom in the data. Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the fit of the "true and error" model to the observed frequencies, using error rates estimated from replications. The purely transitive model gave a good approximation to the data of Study 1; deviations of fit

Table 5 Preference reversals between repetitions (Study 2)

Choice	Response combination				χ^2 (1) Independence	TRUE + ERROR estimates		χ^2 (1) True and error
XY	XX	XY	YX	YY		$\widehat{p}$	$\widehat{e}$	
AB	56	10	5	32	49.96	0.36	0.08	1.63
BC	37	12	13	41	27.21	0.53	0.14	0.04
CA	33	12	12	46	28.54	0.59	0.13	0.00
A'B'	8	2	2	91	62.42	0.92	0.02	0.00
B'C'	52	4	3	44	76.79	0.46	0.04	0.14
C'A'	77	5	4	17	55.77	0.18	0.05	0.11

Last three rows show Series II

Table 6 Fit of purely transitive model to observed frequencies (Study 1)

Pattern	Observed data		Predicted frequencies		Estimated $\hat{p}$
	Both	OR¬both	Both	OR¬both	
000	4	19.5	3.4	23.8	0.00
001	27	19.5	25.0	24.0	0.20
010	55	34.5	52.0	38.2	0.42
011	12	36	15.6	28.6	0.11
100	10	15	9.8	14.2	0.07
101	10	16.5	11.4	16.5	0.09
110	9	21.5	10.1	21.4	0.07
111	2	21.5	5.0	13.9	0.03
Total	129	184	132.4	180.6	1

Error terms were estimated from replications only. The best-fit values are 0.13, 0.16, and 0.14 for Choices #11 and 9, #5 and 15, and #13 and 7, respectively.
Both=The number who show the choice combination on both replications of the three choices, OR¬both=the average number who show the choice combination on either the first or second replication but not both

are not significant, $\chi^2(7)=14.3$. When all parameters were free, the improvement in fit   was not significant, $\chi^2(2)=2.85$, and the estimated rate of intransitivity of both types was $\hat{P}_{000} + \hat{P}_{111} = 3\%$. Therefore, we can retain the hypothesis that everyone was transitive in Study 1.

In Study 2, the fit of the true and error model to the data in Table 7 yielded $\chi^2(9)=4.53$. However, the fit of the purely transitive model was significantly worse, $\chi^2(11)=23.72$, suggesting that the 7% estimated incidence of intransitivity is significantly greater than zero. Fitting the true and error model to the second set, in Table 8, the value of $\chi^2(9)=2.19$, again indicating acceptable fit. With the probabilities of both intransitive patterns set to zero, $\chi^2(11)=36.0$, which is again significant. This analysis indicates that the estimated rate of 2% intransitivity is "significant," relative to the small error rates of Table 5. With paper and pencil method, people can easily check for consistency between repetitions of the same choice, so these error rates might be lower than they would have been had other procedures been used. Although significant, these rates of violation are still quite small.

Table 7 Fit of true and error model to observed frequencies (Study 2, Series I, $n=103$)

Pattern	Observed data		Predicted frequencies		Estimated $\hat{p}$
	Both	OR¬both	Both	OR¬both	
000	2	4.5	1.7	6.1	0.02
001	15	6	12.6	8.9	0.26
010	11	5	9.3	7.5	0.19
011	11	9	9.3	9.1	0.18
100	5	6	5.4	5.0	0.11
101	5	6	4.7	5.6	0.09
110	5	6.5	5.1	5.4	0.10
111	3	3	2.7	4.8	0.05
Total	57	46	50.7	52.3	1

Both=The number who show the choice combination on both replications of the three choices, OR¬both=the average number who show the choice combination on either the first or second replication but not both

Table 8 Fit of true and error model to observed frequencies (Study 2, Series II)

Pattern	Observed data		Predicted frequencies		Estimated $\hat{p}$
	Both	OR¬both	Both	OR¬both	
000	0	1	0.0	1.0	0.00
001	5	0.5	4.7	0.8	0.06
010	1	1.5	1.0	1.0	0.01
011	1	0	0.9	0.4	0.01
100	31	6	31.0	5.2	0.37
101	9	3	8.8	2.8	0.10
110	37	4	35.7	5.2	0.43
111	2	1	1.9	2.5	0.02
Total	86	17	84.1	18.9	1

Both=The number who show the choice combination on both replications of the three choices, OR¬both=the average number who show the choice combination on either the first or second replication but not both

5 Summary and conclusions

Loomes et al. (1989, 1991) and Starmer and Sugden (1998) found that the pattern of intransitivity predicted by regret theory was more frequent than the opposite pattern. As noted above, such asymmetry can easily result from response errors, so inequality of two types of violations is not a proper test of transitivity. In addition, some of the studies confounded tests of transitivity with event-splitting effects, or other complications, rather than testing "real" intransitivity (Humphrey 2001; Sopher and Gigliotti 1993; Starmer and Sugden 1998). Our attempts to replicate these studies yielded data that did not show systematic intransitivity predicted by regret theory; in fact, neither our German nor American samples showed the asymmetry previously reported.

Blavatskyy (2003) reported a substantial incidence of violations of transitivity. He postulated a heuristic of relative probability comparison (see also Blavatskyy 2006). In his experiments, about 55% of subjects indeed exhibited these cycles. However, his study is difficult to compare with ours because lotteries were represented by natural frequencies in a sample of nine previous observations, without any specified probability information. His format of presentation may well be crucial to the effect he reported. We found few people who repeated the pattern predicted by majority rule.

The success of transitivity in our data is compatible with findings of Birnbaum and Gutierrez (2007), who tested violations of transitivity predicted by a lexicographic semi-order, as previously studied by Tversky (1969). Brandstätter et al. (2006) noted that their priority heuristic model implies that most people should systematically violate transitivity with Tversky's choices. As in the present data, however, Birnbaum and Gutierrez also found very few cases of repeated intransitivity, contrary to the conclusions of Tversky (1969) and Brandstätter et al. (2006).[1] Birnbaum and Gutierrez found that most people satisfied transitivity and

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[1] Although the model of Brandstätter et al. (2006) can violate transitivity, it does not predict violations of transitivity in these studies. In Series I, this model predicts $C \succ A \succ B$, in agreement with the most frequently repeated pattern of Study 1. In Study 2 Series II, it predicts $C \succ A \succ B$, which was repeated by only one person; instead, the modal pattern was $C \succ B \succ A$. The TAX model with prior parameters implies this pattern ($C \succ B \succ A$) in both studies. Cumulative prospect theory with parameters of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) implies the order $A \succ C \succ B$ in both studies.

agreed with a single order. Interestingly, this consensus among people occurred despite the fact that Tversky's gambles were designed to have nearly identical expected values.

The true and error model provides a neutral standard for evaluating the question of transitivity. It is also a testable model itself. The statistical tests of the model allow that this model can be retained for these data. Regenwetter and Stober (2006) have a similar approach that differs from ours as follows: whereas we assume that each person may have a different preference pattern that may or may not be transitive, they allow that each person may be sampling from a set of transitive preference orders on each choice. Thus, our definition of transitivity is a special case of their random utility definition. What are termed "errors" in our approach would be attributed in their approach to a person's use of more than one preference order from trial to trial. Analyzing other data, they also conclude that violations of transitivity are rare.

Had either the regret model or majority rule been successful in predicting systematic patterns of intransitivity, it would have been strong evidence against transitive models and supporting instead one of these models. Although they make opposite predictions, some theoreticians find the intuitions of both intransitive models appealing. Why not choose the gamble that most often gives the best outcome? Why not choose the gamble that one would least regret? But our data do not confirm these intuitions. Combining these data with those of Birnbaum and Gutierrez for the lexicographic semiorder and Birnbaum and Schmidt (2006) for choice under risk, we think the burden of proof should shift to those who argue that intransitive models are descriptive of more than 5% or 10% of the population.

In summary, we searched for violations of transitivity where predicted by two models with parameters chosen to explain common findings. When data are analyzed using an error model in which different people can have different "true" preference patterns, but vary in their responses to the same choices due to "errors," we find little evidence to refute the hypothesis that nearly everyone had a transitive preference order.

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