Chapter 1
- applying investment advice from CNN's Moneyline (a program on investing and the stock market) or the Wall Street Journal to your own investment needs
- appraising a political candidate
- learning to swing a golf club
- memorizing your grocery shopping list
- planning how to prepare for a particular exam
- remembering the lyrics of an old song
- trying to recall an experience of a bad date or social encounter
- trying to recall the face of a teacher from elementary or secondary school
Please fell free to send me e-mail
Chapter 2
1. Think of the process by which you formed an impression of someone you met in person versus the process by which you formed an impression of someone you met over the internet or by watching a film of that person or whom you watched interacting with other people but did not directly interact with yourself. What are some of the similarities and differences between or among these different processes and in the information used in these different cases? Do you think that these differences make a significant difference? Do you think that one of these is more "natural" than the other?
2. Describe in your own words at least three of the different viewpoints/models of the organization of person impressions. Apply each of these models to a real world example (preferably, but not necessarily, to the same example). How do(es) this example or examples illustrate some of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the models? Which of these models do you think gives the most reasonable, convincing account of the organization of our impressions of people?
3. What do Wyer and Srull and others see as the role of "processing objectives" or "goals" in impression formation and person memory? What is some of the research evidence on this topic? Give an everyday example(s) of these processing goals in operation. What was the general reservation expressed by the author with regard to these processes, and what alternative position did he present? How would you evaluate the processing goals position?
4. Select three people: a close friend or relative, a mere acquaintance, and a movie star or politician whom you know only through the media. Think about your impressions of each of these three people and specify what features you emphasize or in what ways you represent or think about these people. Which form or unit of representation seems most plausible or reasonable for capturing these representations? Do different forms apply to different figures? To what extent do you think that the Brewer and/or Fiske and Neuberg viewpoints apply here, for example, to the close friend versus the mere acquaintance?
5. Once again, think about the three figures you selected in the previous question. Make a judgment about each of these people (one person at a time) as quickly as you can (i.e., make a "snap" judgment) on the following traits or descriptions:
Did you have to access any particular information or pieces of knowledge in order to make these judgments? To what extent were your judgments made on the basis of evaluative versus descriptive information? Were those based on evaluative information quicker and easier or slower and more difficult than those based on descriptive or real world information? What did this exercise tell you about the relationship between memory and judgment, and between evaluative versus descriptive factors in person memory?
6. Write a couple of paragraphs about your impression of a good friend of yours. What kinds of information (e.g., units, formats, evaluative versus descriptive information, etc.) did you include in your description? Do you think that this verbal description captures your "impression" of that person? Do the same with a person whom you just met for the first time within the past couple of months (or about whom you hadn't formed an impression before that meeting). Is your description different for this person? Are the units, formats, etc., different for this person? What can you conclude from this exercise?
7. Compare and contrast the Fiske and Neuberg and the Brewer models of impression formation on the one hand, with the PDP models discussed in Chapter 2 on the other. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these three models? Compare and contrast the Brewer and the Fiske and Neuberg models in terms of their representation and processing assumptions. Which do you think provides the best account of the impression formation process?
8. Take some movie star or politician who maintains a kind of public persona that you think may be different from his or her "real" underlying personality. What clues do you notice that make you think that there may be this discrepancy? Do you have some transformational rules or procedures for making a meaningful connection between these two impressions; and if so, can you specify these rules?
9. Compare and contrast the Wyer and Srull information-processing model of impression formation with the revised Wyer and Radvansky model. What do you think was added or lost by the revision? How does the revision relate to the discussion of event memory discussed in Chapter 4? Finally, how does this revision relate back to the models of everyday cognition discussed in Chapter 1?
10. How did Hastie and Park conceptualize the relationship between memory and judgment? Give an everyday example of the distinction made by Hastie and Park. To what extent do you think that an "impression" corresponds more to the memory or to the judgment component, and what are the implications of this separation between memory and judgment for the whole notion of impression formation? What other distinctions discussed in this chapter does the memory-judgment distinction relate to?
11. What was the general criticism expressed by the author with regard to existing research on impression formation? What are some examples of studies and theoretical formulations that are subject to this criticism? How does this criticism relate back to the discussion of social cognition in Chapter 1? How would you evaluate this criticism of research on impression formation? What do you think might be an alternative way of studying impression formation and person memory?
Identification:
processing objectives
References: Andersen, S. M., & Glassman, N. S. (1996). Responding to significant others when they are not there: Effects on interpersonal inference, motivation, and affect. R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition. (Vol. 3, pp. 262-321). New York: Guilford--review of research on the effects of previous person representations on impression formation.
Brewer & Feinstein (1999)--most recent presentation of Brewer's dual process
model of impression formation
Fiske (1999)--a recent presentation of the Fiske and Neuberg model
Gilbert (1998)--chapter in the Handbook of Social Psychology on "Ordinary personology"
Hastie & Park (1986)--original paper on on-line versus memory-based judgment
Read & Miller (Eds.) (1998c)--book on connectionist models in social psychology, includes chapters by Read & Miller (1998a), Smith & DeCoster (1998b) and Thagard & Kunda (1998)
Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth (1979)--a good review of the "early" research on "person perception
Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. Personality and Social Psychology Review, --presents general model of two separate memory systems or "processing modes"
Wyer & Radvansky (1999)--most recent reformulation of Wyer and Srull model emphasizing event information
Chapter 3
1. What is meant by saying that faces or face recognition is "special"? What was the original finding that raised this issue, and what is some of the controversy surrounding this finding? Review in your own words at least three other lines of research that have been presented to support this "specialness" claim. What are some of the conclusions that have been reached regarding the "specialness" of faces? Do you believe that faces are "special" visual patterns?
2. In this chapter the author presented both brain and behavioral evidence for the "specialness" of faces. Briefly review, in your own words, at least one example of each of these types of evidence, as well as the reservations expressed regarding each. Do you think that one of these types of evidence is more compelling than the others? In general, do you think that brain or physiological evidence is intrinsically more convincing than behavioral data?
3. Briefly review in your own words the evidence for and against the featural versus the configurational or prototype views of the cognitive representation of faces. What is/are the fundamental issue(s) involved in the debate between or among these positions? How does this debate relate to the similar debate in the person memory area? Which of these (i.e., featural versus holistic views) do you think is the more convincing position?
4. Briefly review in your own words the concept of a face recognition unit (FRU) and some of the evidence supporting and arguing against such a concept. Give a specific, concrete everyday example of such a concept (other than the ones given in the text). What is the alternative viewpoint put forward by Bruce and her associates, and what is an everyday example that illustrates the difference between this viewpoint and the notion of an FRU? Which of these formulations do you think is most reasonable?
5. Briefly describe in your own words the Bruce and Young (or Hay and Young) model of face recognition and indicate how this model represents an information-processing model. Give an everyday example or two of the operation of the different components of this model. What is some of the evidence that supports such a model (other than the ones given in the text), and what is some of the evidence against it? What is the alternative position put forward by Bruce et al.?
6. Briefly develop in your own words the outlines of PDP or connectionist models of face recognition, and give an everyday example that illustrates the attractions of such models. Describe one of the specific PDP models developed in Chapter 3. How are PDP models of face recognition similar to and different from the PDP models of impression formation developed in Chapter 2? How would you evaluate these PDP models of face recognition?
7. Briefly describe in your own words Bahrick's naturalistic research on face recognition, including both his general rationale and also his specific study illustrating this rationale. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of such naturalistic studies in comparison to laboratory studies of face recognition? How generalizable do you think that Bahrick's findings and research methodology are to other areas of recognition memory for faces? Propose at least one specific, concrete study or research area (other than eyewitness memory) to which Bahrick's methodology might be applied. How would you evaluate Bahrick's research?
8. In Chapter 2 I argued that too much of the research on impression formation and person memory has been conducted in the lab, and that more naturalistic research was needed. Taking Bahrick's research on face recognition as a model, design (or at least give the general outlines of) a naturalistic study of impression formation. To what extent do you think that such a study really does represent an improvement on or a valuable addition to the traditional lab approach to research on impression formation? Do you think that the areas of impression formation and face recognition are sufficiently similar to make such a generalization of methods plausible? Do you think that one of these areas lends itself more to naturalistic study than the other?
9. Briefly review in your own words some of the applications of lab research on memory in general, and on eyewitness identification in particular, to real world eyewitness identification situations. Indicate some of the specific findings from face recognition research (or memory in general) that might be used to improve eyewitness identification. To what extent do you think that lab or mock studies can be reasonably applied to such real world situations, and why?
10. What are some of the similarities and differences between research on person memory on the one hand. and on face recognition on the other? If you were to try to integrate these two areas, conceptually and in terms of research, how would you go about doing so? Where might be a point of connection between the two areas? Suggest, in broad outline, what a study addressing both areas simultaneously might look like.
Identification:
References: Cebeza, R., Bruce, V., Kato, T., & Oda, M. (1999). The prototype effect in face recognition: Extension and limits. Memory & Cognition, 139-151--still another exploration of the role of facial prototypes in face recognition.
Á Ellis, A., & Young, A. (Eds.) (1989). Handbook of research on face processing--good source of reviews of the literature on the "specialness" issue (Morton & Johnson, 1989), "semantic" factors in face recognition (Young & Ellis, 1989), the relevance of face recognition research to eyewitness identification (Laughery & Wogalter,1989), among others
Lander, K., Christie, F., & Bruce, V. (1999). The role of movement in the recognition of famous faces. Memory & Cognition, 27, 974-985--introduction of role of natural movement in face recognition
Chapter 4
1. What are the distinctions that Schank and Abelson make between scripts and plans on the one hand, and between scripts and themes on the other? What are some everyday examples of these differences (other than those given in the text)? Review in your own words some of the research on these three concepts, and indicate how the research on the three differs. How do these concepts relate back to the schema model, and to what extent do you think these concepts could be translated into an associative network or PDP conceptualization? How important do you think that each of these concepts is in everyday thinking?
2. What is the distinction that Schank and Kolodner make between scripts on the one hand, and MOPs and EMOPs on the other? What is the crux of this distinction, and how does it relate to the generality-versus specificity-of-knowledge issue? Give some everyday examples of these distinctions (other than those given in the text)? What are some other concepts discussed in Chapter 4 (and Chapter 6) that focus on these same kinds of issues? How would you evaluate the concepts of MOPs and EMOPs?
3. Compare and contrast the forms of mental representation assumed by researchers and theorists in the person memory area on the one hand, with Schank and Abelson's earlier and later views of event memory on the other. How does this distinction relate to the revised Wyer and Radvansky model discussed in Chapter 2? Which of these representational formats seems most reasonable to you, or do you think that there's room for both? If so, how might you reconcile the two?
4. What is meant by case-based reasoning (CBR), and what are some everyday examples (other than the ones developed in the text) of this concept? In what important ways is this viewpoint different from Schank's script and MOPs concepts? What is the concept of indexing, and how does this concept relate to EMOPS and CBR? What is the importance of this concept of indexing, and what are some everyday examples of the concept? How would you evaluate the role of case©based reasoning in everyday life?
5. What do Schank and Abelson mean by
the story-based model, and how
does it derive from their earlier script and theme-based models? How is this
story-based model
different from these
earlier concepts, and why is that difference important? Give an example of the
story-based model
applied to everyday cognition. How reasonable an account do
you think that this model, as opposed to say, PDP models,
gives of everyday thinking?
6. What are some of the distortions in event memory that have been studied in the lab? How easily distorted do you think our memory is? Do you think that lab research overestimates or underestimates the amount of such distortion in everyday life? What are some everyday examples of such distortion (other than the eyewitness memory examples given in the text), either from your own life or from the lives of friends or public figures? To what extent do you think that event memory is more subject to such distortions than other types of memory (e.g., memory for objects or people); and if so, why?
7. Briefly review in yor own words Elizabeth Loftus's account of the distortions involved in eyewitness memory, and contrast this account with that given by McCloskey and Zaragoza. What is some of the evidence for and against these two positions? To what extent is the debate between these two camps substantive or just methodological? What is the source monitoring account of eyewitness memory? To what extent do you think that source monitoring provides a general account of memory? Finally, how would you evaluate the research evidence on the distortion of eyewitness memory?
8. What is prospective memory, and what are some of the similarities and differences between prospective and retrospective memory? What are some everyday examples of prospective memory (other than the ones described in the text), and what are some of the distinctions made between the different types of prospective memory? Compare and contrast the laboratory and naturalistic study of prospective memory. To what extent do you think that the lab studies are representative of or make contact with everyday instances of prospective memory?
9. Describe in your own words the different models of prospective (PM) memory put forward by McDaniel and Einstein and by Ellis and Shallice. Give an everyday example (other than those reviewed in the text) of each these models or types of PM. Which of these, if either, do you think gives the best account of prospective memory? How do these various models relate to the general models of everyday cognition developed in Chapter 1? Finally, to what extent do you think that prospective memory is a meaningful concept in and of itself?
10. Describe in your own words the similarities and differences between the Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth and the Hammond and Seifert models of the cognitive representation of planning. How do these models relate to Schank and Abelson's conception of our understanding of plans and to the models of everyday cognition developed in Chapter 1? What is meant by the term "opportunistic planning," and how does each of these models propose to deal with this feature? To what extent do you think that such an explicit cognitive representation is always involved in planning? What is Suchman's critique of this cognitive representation assumption?
11. What are some of the connections between the accounts of planning reviewed in Chapter 4 and the discussions of prospective memory on the one hand, and of case-based reasoning on the other? How are these connections illustrated in the examples given by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth and by Hammond and Seifert? What are the different types of memory and retrieval assumed in the different accounts of planning and in the study of prospective memory? In general, what do you see as the role of memory in planning?
Identification:
References: Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel (Eds.) (1996)--a collection of various theoretical perspectives on prospective memory
Burgess, P. W., & Shallice, Y. (1997)--as the title suggests, an attempt to explore the relationship between prospective and retrospective memory.
Kolodner, J., & Guzdial, M. (2000). Theory and practice of case-based learning tools. In D. H. Jonassen & S. M. Land (Eds.), Theoretical foundations of learning environments (pp. 215-242)--a review of CBR and its implications for learning environments
Reason, J., & Mycielska, K. (1982). Absent-minded? The psychology of memory lapses and everyday errors. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall--an early discussion of this interesting topic
Schacter, D. L. (2000). The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets and remembersÄÄ. New York: Houghton-Mifflin--a readable, semi-popular account of some of the major types of memory errors that we make in everyday life, e.g., absentmindedness, blocking, along with psychological and neurological accounts of them.
Schank, R. C. (1999). Dynamic memory revisited. Chapters 11 and 12. (pp. 185-236). New York: Cambridge Press--chapters dealing with unconscious knowledge in dynamic memory and with CBR in problem solving
Chapter 5
1. Review in your own words some of the definitions of, or criteria for autobiographical memory (AM). Think of an example of a memory that might meet one of these definitions or criteria, but not another. Which do you think is the best definition or criterion? Do these differences really make a difference? Why do you think there's been so much disagreement about this definition? Similarly, why do you think that everyday cognition has frequently been equated with AM? (Hint: see Question 2.) Finally, what are the distinctions made by Brewer among different types of AM, and what are some examples (other than those given in the text) of each? To what extent do you think that these distinctions are intuitively and theoretically meaningful?
2. Briefly review in your own words the debate over accuracy in the study of autobiographical memory. How does this debate relate to the discussion of the differences between the laboratory and the everyday study of memory in Chapter 1? To what extent to you think that accuracy is or is not an important issue in studying AM (as opposed to the traditional study of memory)? What do you think the best criterion of accuracy would be? Review in your own words Brewer's three models that speak to this question of accuracy, and briefly review the evidence for and against each. Which model do you think offers the best account of AM?
3. Describe in your own words the concept of flashbulb memories and Brown and Kulik's account of it. Give an example from your own experience of a flashbulb memory. Review some of the evidence on this concept, and indicate how this research bears on the issue of accuracy and Brewer's three models of such accuracy. To what extent do you think that flashbulb memories provide any special insight into the phenomenon of autobiographical memory?
4a. Try to retrieve an autobiographical memory for each of the following cues and/or descriptions:
b. Now go back and try to think about the exact process by which you came up with (or failed to come up with) that memory. Is that process different for different types of memories? How do these processes fit into the discussion of the mechanisms of retrieval of AM discussed in Chapter 6?
5. In what ways is autobiographical memory similar to and different from event memory? Do you think that memories have to involve events in order to be "autobiographical"? To what extent does the discussion of event memory in Chapter 4 bear upon this issue? (See also Chapter 6.) Relate this issue to the study of the development of AM (including infantile amnesia) versus the development of simple event memory.
6. Briefly review in your own words Rubin et al.'s summary of the different studies of the distribution of autobiographical memories over a lifetime and indicate some of the reasons that there was such disagreement in earlier studies. What is meant by the "reminiscence peak," and what are some accounts of this peak? Which of these accounts seems to make most sense? Finally, how does the distribution of AMs compare to the distribution of memories for other kinds of information?
7. What is meant by "forward telescoping," and what are some accounts of such telescoping? Give an example of such telescoping from your own experience? How does the dating of AMs in general relate to our memory for autobiographical events in general? How do social and cultural factors enter in to the dating of AMs? What is an example (other than the ones discussed in the text) of such social-cultural influences? Finally, what are some of the procedures that have been developed to reduce forward telescoping?
8. Briefly review in your own words some of the methods and the results from the Linton and the Wagenaar diary studies. What were some of the major differences between these two studies? What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of the diary study approach, and what are some of the findings defending diary studies from their critics? If you were to design a diary study of your own, how might you avoid some of the drawbacks of the Linton and Wagenaar studies, or could you? How would you evaluate the diary study method?
9. What is meant by the term "infantile" or "childhood amnesia," and what are some of the different ways in which this phenomenon has been studied? Give an example of how such research has been carried out. What is the first memory that you can recall from your own childhood? What are some of the problems with both the retrospective and the developmental approaches? What do you think is the best way of studying infantile amnesia? From the review of the literature given in the text, what do you think the upper age of infantile amnesia is?
10. Briefly review in your own words any three of the following different cognitive accounts of infantile amnesia: Pillemer and White, Nelson, Hudson, and Fivush. What does each of these three theorists see as the critical feature in the emergence of autobiographical memory, and what features/emphases do the three accounts have in common? To what extent do you think that narrative style of thought is a prerequisite for the development of AM? How does this emphasis relate to our earlier discussion of the definition of AM? Which of these accounts, if any, do you think is most reasonable?
11. Briefly review in your own words the debate between Katherine Nelson on the one hand, and Howe and Courage on the other, about the definition, criteria, and age of the emergence of autobiographical memory. What are some of the differences in the models of memory and cognitive functioning assumed by these two accounts? What is the criticism raised by Perner and Ruffman against Howe and Courage's viewpoint? Which of these two accounts, i.e., Nelson's or Howe and Courage's, if either, do you think is most reasonable?
Identification:
References: *Conway (1990a). Chapters 1-???--a discussion of historical and definitional issues, as well as flashbulb memories and distributional and dating issues
Harley, K., & Reese, E. (1999). Origins of autobiographical memory. Developmental Psychology,, 1338-1348--a comparison of the Howe and Courage and the Nelson or Fivush and Reese views of the emergence of AM
Howe, M. L. (2000). Chapter 5 ("Development of autobiographical memory"), Pp. 81-103©©a review of theories of infantile amnesia, with particular emphasis on the Howe and Courage viewpoint
Pillemer, D. B. (1998). Chapter 2 ("Memorable moments"), pp. 25-62--anecdotal and research evidence on memory for individual dramatic experiences
Rubin (1998)--another, more recent discussion of the defining features of AM
Rubin, Wetzel, & Nebes (1986)--a classic integration of the literature on the distribution of autobiographical memories, emphasizing the "reminiscence
Chapter 6
1. What is the "activity dominance" view of the organization and retrieval of autobiographical memory, and what is some of the evidence for and against this viewpoint? What were some proposed alternatives to this view? Which of these views seems most convincing to you, either in terms of your own intuitive experiences or in terms of the empirical evidence reviewed in Chapter 6? To what extent do you think that autobiographical memory is organized in the same way or differently from other forms of everyday memory?
2. Compare and contrast the Reiser et al. constructivist view of the organization and retrieval of autobiographical memories with the constructivist views discussed in Chapter 5. To what other ideas presented in earlier chapters does the Reiser et al. viewpoint relate? How does the concept of "themes" fit in here? Finally, review Conway's hierarchical model of the organization of AM. To what extent do you think that AM is, in fact, reconstructive?
3. Review in your own words the three major accounts of the retrieval of autobiographical memories, and the evidence for each of these. How do these accounts relate to the models of the organization of AMs discussed on Question #2; and in general, how is retrieval related to the organization of AM? Once again, which of these accounts of autobiographical memory makes the most intuitive sense?
4. Discuss in your own words some of the distinctions between models of the organization and retrieval of autobiographical memory on the one hand, and models or accounts of memory as studied in traditional lab studies on the other (including, for example, studies of person memory). What do you see as some of the sources of these distinctions between the two areas? (Hint: see the observation by Klein and Loftus on the difference between self-knowledge and the kinds of knowledge or memory studied in traditional lab studies.) What are some of the implications of these distinctions for the study of everyday memory in general?
5. Briefly describe in your own words some of the similarities and differences between the Thompson et al. and the Brewer diary studies of the retrieval of autobiographical memory, both in terms of their methods, their results, and their conceptions of AM. How do these diary studies in general differ in both methods and results from other more controlled studies of autobiographical memory? How would you evaluate these two different approaches (i.e., diary versus more controlled studies) to the study of AM?
6. What was the problem with diary studies that Brewer's two studies were designed to deal with, and how did he propose to do so? What were some of the main findings and conclusions of those two studies? To what extent do think that Brewer's studies did and did not solve the aforementioned problem? What do you think of the idea of rating events at the time of encoding in general, and of assessing the "phenomenological" characteristics of AM?
7. Briefly review in your words some of the findings reported by Berntsen and by Roberts and McGinnies on the nature of involuntary memories. Give some examples from your own experience of such memories. What are some of the reasons why these kinds of AMs are much more difficult to study than the voluntary sort discussed throughout Chapters 5 and 6; and what are some possible methods that might be applied to studying them? What do you see as the relative importance of these involuntary memories in comparison to voluntary ones?
8. What does Berntsen see as the distinctive sources or origins of voluntary versus involuntary memories? How does this distinction relate to Salaman's view of the distinctive nature of involuntary memories? Indicate what other distinctions in the autobiographical memory area (as well as in other areas that have been considered in this book) this distinction resembles. To what extent do you believe that voluntary and involuntary memories come from different "stores"?
9. What are some of the different views of the self put forward by Neisser and by Conway? What were the major findings and conclusions of Klein and Loftus's research on the relationship between the self and AM, and how does the conception of the self assumed in this research relate to Neisser's and Conway's conceptions? How would you evaluate that research, and what might be another strategy for studying the same topic? How is the relation (or lack thereof) between the self and AM similar to the relation (or lack thereof) between judgment and memorydiscussed in Chapter 2?
10. One of the characteristics of AMs emphasized in the text is the degree to which they involve knowledge structures. What are some of the ways in which such knowledge structures affect AM, and to what extent do you think that such knowledge structures are also involved in involuntary memories? How might involuntary memories relate to Conway's hierarchical model and to the two memory system viewpoint discussed in Chapter 7? (See also #9.)
11. One of the major themes considered throughout this chapter has to do with the strategic versus passive nature of autobiographical memory. Give some everyday examples of both types of AM and indicate how the two have been studied. What are some of the possible differences in the mechanisms underlying these different types of memory retrieval? How does the distinction between strategic and passive AM relate to the distinction made in Chapter 1 between everyday and lab studies of memory in general?
Identification:
References: Bernsten (1996, 1998)--two initial attempts to study¸ involuntary memories in a systematic way
*Conway (1990?). Chapters ??--discussion of the organization and retrieval of autobiographical memories, as well the relation of AM to the self and "memories that come unbidden"
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000)--a recent theoretical discussion of AM in the context of the "self-memory system"
Conway & Rubin (1993)--a discussion of the structure of autobiographical memory
Chapter 7
1. Review in your own words some of the distinctions between formal and informal reasoning discussed in Chapter 7, and give your own examples of these differences. What are the implications of these differences for the study of formal reasoning, as well as the teaching of such reasoning? (See Chapter 10.) For example, do these differences make the study/teaching of formal reasoning less relevant or important, or, alternatively, do they make informal reasoning intractable to study?
2. Review in your own words some of the common characteristics of expert performance. Suggest how these characteristics might apply to some particular "technical" skill (e.g., lawyering, surfing the net, playing bridge, playing basketball). Then show how these characteristics do or do not apply to some kind of everyday skill (e.g., meeting new people, baking a cake, studying for an exam, shopping for clothes, applying makeup, driving). Do you think that studies of expert performance do or do not apply to everyday cognition?
3. Discuss some of the similarities and differences among the skills involved in chess, baseball, and typing, as described in Chapter 7. To what extent do you think that the model of expertise provided by chess grandmasters is useful for understanding other forms of skilled performance? For example, do you think that the importance of a rich store of background knowledge applies to skills other than chess? What are skilled memory theory and the perceptual chunking notion, and how do these ideas apply to other forms of skilled performance? To what extent do you think that driving a car might be a better model, as some observers have suggested? Finally, to what extent do you think that the activities we engage in on a daily basis can reasonably be called "skills"?
4. Compare and contrast the three different accounts of expertise developed by Ericsson and his associates. In particular, contrast the innate talent and the acquired mechanism viewpoints. To what extent do you think that "deliberate practice" can account for expertise at the expense of innate talents? Which of the three models can be most readily applied to everyday skills such as those developed in Questions 2 and 3?
5. Compare and contrast Anderson's proceduralization model of skill acquisition with that put forward by Dreyfus and Dreyfus. To what extent do you think that expertise is holistic, as Dreyfus and Dreyfus propose, as opposed to something that can be broken down into components, as Shiffrin, for example, has argued? Give an everyday example of a skill that is better viewed as more holistic, and one that can be seen as more componential. Which of these models (if either) do you think gives a more reasonable account of everyday skills or expertise, and why? To what extent is everyday expertise (e.g., social skills or skills at sports or the computer) automatized or implicit (as opposed to something that we have to think about)?
6. Compare and contrast Singley and Anderson's view of transfer with that put forward by Pennnington and Rehder. Which of these two viewpoints do you think gives a more reasonable account of everyday transfer? Give an example of transfer in your everyday experience (other than transfer from school learning). To what extent do you think that the findings for the difficulty of transfer from more well-structured domain skills apply to transfer of everyday learning? If you think everyday transfer is different, why do you think that's so?
7. Describe in your own words some of the different types of transfer reviewed in Chapter 7, and give some everyday examples of these different types. What are some of the implications of the results on transfer for everyday learning or experience? Why do you think that it's so difficult to "notice similarity" in transferring knowledge? What was Lave's critique of transfer research? Why do you think that educators continue to believe in transfer when the evidence for it seems to be so hard to come by? Do you think the evidence is wrong? If so, what are your reasons for thinking so?
8. Some commentators on education have proposed that, in addition to reading, writing, and arithmetic, we should also be teaching topics such as values or life skills or financial skills. What does the literature on transfer have to say about teaching these kinds of principles or skills? What would Detterman in particular have to say about this sort of education? To take this one step further, what do the results of transfer of training research suggest about the efficacy of psychotherapy?
9. What are some of the similarities and differences between the concepts of transfer of knowledge on the one hand, and of domain specificity on the other? Give an example of a study on each of these topics, as well as the general conclusion from research on each. To what extent do the two areas have similar or different implications for the nature of education? What do Perkins and Salomon offer as a compromise solution to the two problems or issues?
10. Review in your own words the three generations of research on domain specificity and the general results/conclusions from each generation. Give some examples from your own experience of both domain specificity and more general principles or skills. What was the distinction made by Perkins and Salomon between the high versus low road to transfer, and what are examples of this distinction in everyday thinking? What conclusions do Perkins and Salomon reach in their review? Based on your own experience, do you agree with them?
Identification:
References: Ericsson (1996 a, b)-- good introduction to expertise research, along with a good selection of chapters from different areas of expertise
Ericsson & Smith (1991b)--an earlier, even better
collection of chapters on various areas of expertise
Feltovich, P. J., & Spiro. R. J., & Coulson, R. L. (1997). Issues of expert flexibility in contexts characterized by flexibility and change. In P. J. Feltovich, K. M. Ford, & R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), Expertise in context: Human and machine (pp. 125-146). Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Pres/ MIT Press--presents two models of expertise, one of which flexible to chance, and one of which is not
Proctor, R. W., & Dutta, A. (1995). Skill acquisition and human performance. Thousand OaksL Sage Publ (Chapter 8)--a pretty good presentaion on expertise
Chapter 8
1. Briefly review and compare in your own words the accounts of thinking (and the different types of thinking) given by Scribner and by Lave. How do these accounts relate to the views of street math offered by Saxe and Carraher et al., and the viewpoint underlying Ceci and Liker's approach to racetrack handicapping? What point or issue would you say is at the heart of these different views, and what are some of the other issues they all are concerned with? How would you evaluate these various positions?
2. Briefly review in your own words the basic methodology used by Scribner, Saxe, Carraher et al, and by Ceci and Liker to study practical thinking and street math. In what ways does this methodology differ from the one used in most lab studies of thinking and reasoning? Where does the research by Wagner and Sternberg fit in here? To what extent do you think, as the author suggests, that the methodology used by Scribner et al, offers a prototype for other everyday cognition research?
3. Briefly review in your own words some of the major findings reported by Scribner from her research on dairy workers. What do these findings suggest about the differences between thinking as studied in the lab or school and everyday thinking? To what extent do you think that Scribner's findings can be generalized to other types or instances of everyday thinking? To what extent do you think that the distinction between so-called "practical" thinking and "theoretical" thinking or intelligence is a useful and/or clearcut one?
4. Three of the major concepts in Chapter 7 were expertise, transfer of training, and domain specificity. Show how these concepts were applied in the research discussed in Chapter 8 by Scribner, Lave, Carraher et al., and Ceci and Liker. How does the study of these concepts in these four research projects resemble and differ from the studies described in Chapter 7?
5. Both Saxe and Carraher et al. discuss the role of social factors in the use of street math. Briefly review in your own words the discussions by these two sets of researchers of this issue. Indicate how these discussions relate to the research on "culture and cognition" also discussed in Chapter 8. What does all of this have to say about the study of math skills and the processes of mathematical problem solving in everyday life? (See Chapter 10.)
6. One of the central themes in Chapter 8 concerns the relationship between school or academic abilities and IQ on the one hand, and everyday thinking on the other. Review in your own words the discussions of this issue by at least three of the researchers or research projects covered in this chapter. What general conclusion(s) do you think can be drawn from these various discussions? What implications do these studies have for the teaching of math (or other skills) in schools?
7. Defend and provide evidence for each of the following possible conclusions from research on practical reasoning:
a. In general, people's use of math in everyday life seems to be fairly dumb. People seem to resort to old, familiar, rote rules and strategies; and they ignore the more abstract, more generalizable skills they've learned in school.
b. In general, people's use of math in everyday life often seems to be quite astute and creative, often belying their lack of education or apparent lack of abilities in traditional math and logical problem solving.
Is it possible for both of these conclusions to be correct, or is it possible for there to be some kind of compromise between these two positions? (cf. Chapter 10 for a similar debate)
8. Chapter 8 discussed two different research projects on gambling. What are some of the similarities and differences between the Schliemann and Acioly and the Ceci and Liker studies, both in terms of their methodologies, their rationales, and their conclusions? How does Ceci and Liker's view differ from that of other researchers on gambling and decision making in general? Can you think of an everyday skill in which you believe that you or someone you know shows the same kind of cognitive complexity as Ceci and Liker's racetrack handicappers seem to possess?
9. Defend (or refute) the following argument (from Gladwin): Puluwat navigation and the common skill of driving can be viewed as better, more useful models of everyday thinking, than more rational, theoretical modes or models of thought, How does this argument relate to Scribner's account of practical thinking and to the differences between formal and informal reasoning developed earlier?
10. Briefly discuss in your own words the conceptual rationale and methodology for the notion of "tacit knowledge" as developed by Wagner and Sternberg. How is this conception of everyday knowledge and Wagner and Sternberg's research on it similar to and different from the other sorts of research discussed in Chapter 8. Give some everyday examples of tacit knowledge, both in the career area and in other areas of everyday life. How much of everyday knowledge do you think is "tacit"? How would you propose studying this sort of knowledge?
11. Briefly describe in your own words Sternberg's conception of practical intelligence and indicate how tacit knowledge fits into that conception. From what model of everyday cognition does this conception of practical intelligence seem to derive? In what ways does Wagner and Sternberg's assessment of tacit knowledge seem to be consistent with that model, and in what ways, if any, doesn't it? What are some examples of skills or intelligences (other than those studied by Wagner, Sternberg, and their associates) that can be said to fall under practical intelligence, as defined by Sternberg, and what are some skills or intelligences that do not? Finally, what do Wagner and Sternberg see as the advantage of assessing practical intelligence opposed to IQ?
Identification:
References: Carraher, D., & Schliemann, A. (2000). Lessons from everyday reasoning in mathematics. In D. H. Jonassen & S, M. Land (Eds.), Theoretical foundations of learning environments (pp. 173-195).Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates--review of findings from street math and implications for instruction
Cole (1996)--an excellent presentation of the "cultural" point of view
*Hinton (198?)--a good presentation of Hinton's reinterpretation of the observations on Puluwat navigation, and his attempt to draw a connection to everyday cognition
Sternberg & Horvath (1999)--a recent presentation of tacit knowledge and its application to management, sales, the military, etc.
Chapter 9
1. Briefly review in your own words three out of the four major heuristics identified by Kahneman and Tversky. In what ways do these constitute "heuristics"? What are some of the errors in everyday judgment that follow from these heuristics? Give your own everyday examples of each of these errors. What were some of the criticisms voiced against these heuristics? How would you evaluate the role of such heuristics?
2. Describe in your own word and review the research evidence for two of the following errors: the base rate fallacy, the conjunction fallacy, the gambler's fallacy, illusory correlation. Indicate how each of these errors can be accounted for in terms of a heuristic identified by Tversky and Kahneman, and give your own everyday examples of each error. How important or prominent a role do you think that these errors play in our everyday lives, and why?
3. What did Kahneman and Tversky mean by the "simulation heuristic"? What are some everyday examples of this heuristic (other than the ones discussed in the text)? Review in your own words some of the research that bears directly or indirectly on this heuristic. How is the simulation heuristic similar to and different from the availability heuristic, and how does it relate to counterfactual thinking in general? How significant a role do you think the simulation heuristic or thinking in terms of simulations plays in our lives, and why?
4. Briefly describe in your own words the so-called "confirmation bias," and give some everyday examples of this bias. Review the task or paradigm used by Wason for studying this bias What are some of the criticisms raised against the paradigm and against the idea of a confirmation bias in general? What are some of the alternative conceptualizations or translations of this bias? How important a factor do you think this confirmation bias is in our everyday judgments, and what do you think is the best way of thinking about or conceptualizing this effect?
5. Briefly review in your own words the results of Wason's selection task, and describe some of the different interpretations that have been given for these results. What are some of the observed effects of specific content on the results of the selection task, and what are some of the explanations that have been given of these effects? Give one or two of your own everyday examples of these effects. How do these effects relate to the familiarity effects discussed in previous chapters? Finally, to what extent do you think that using everyday materials fundamentally changes the selection task, or does it simply add a set of checks and blocks to the usual erroneous inferences?
6. Briefly review in your own words the different conceptions of "rationality" reviewed in Chapter 9, and indicate how the debate over rationality bears on the research on judgment heuristics. In particular, describe Evans's distinction between two different types or senses of rationality. Do you think this distinction is useful or meaningful? How does this distinction relate to the research on practical intelligence reviewed in Chapter 8, and what are the implications for the apparent paradox or opposition between the results on practical intelligence and those on judgment heuristics? How "rational" or "irrational" do you think humans really are, or does such a question even make any sense?
7. What is the "fundamental attribution error (FAE)," and why is it so-called? In what senses can it be said to be or not to be an "error"? Give some of your own everyday examples of the FAE. What are some of the different accounts that have been given of the FAE; or more specifically, how has the FAE been related to the various judgment heuristics? What were some criticisms of these attempts to explain the FAE in terms of heuristics? What are some of the reasons given by Gilbert and Malone for why the FAE may not be that much of a problem in real life? How important or "fundamental" do you think the FAE really is in everyday life?
8. Describe in your own words at least two of the following three "social psychological" biases: the actor-observer effect, the false consensus effect, and belief perseverance. What are some of your own everyday examples of these biases or effects? What are some explanations that have been offered for these effects? In particular, how can such effects be linked to judgment heuristics or other cognitive processes? To what extent do you believe that these biases offer anything new, over and above the other biases? How would you evaluate these different errors?
9. Defend or refute the following assertions:
a. the study of judgment heuristics has paid too much attention to error and cognitive biases.
b. As a result of this emphasis on bias, the study of heuristics and biases has not paid sufficient attention to the exact cognitive processes or knowledge structures that underlie such biases.
To what extent do you think that heuristics per se give a sufficient account of how we think when we make everyday judgments?
10. Briefly describe in your own words the overconfidence and hindsight biases, and indicate what these two biases have in common. What is some of the evidence that has been presented in support of these biases? Give an everyday example of each bias. How are these biases related to other errors and biases reviewed in this chapter and to the ever-present judgment heuristics? What conclusion do Hawkins and Hastie reach about the hindsight bias? How significant a role do you think that these biases play in everyday life?
11. Briefly describe in your own words the rationale behind research on naturalistic decision making (NDM), and describe some of the research that has been done in support of this rationale. What are some of the presumed cognitive processes and structures involved in NDM, and how do these differ from the processes assumed to operate in most traditional models of decision making? How does the NDM model relate to research discussed in earlier chapters? To what extent do you think that NDM represents an improvement over traditional models and research on decision making or just a "minor perturbation" (Jones, 1985) in the traditional approach to decision making?
Identification:
References: Dawes, R. (2001). Irrationality: How pseudoscientists, lunatics, and the rest of us systematically fail to be rational Boulder, CO: Westview Press--uses a couple of issues (e.g., diagnosis. of child abuse) to make the case for the kinds of judgment errors we make everyday
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. (2000). Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox. In G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, and the ABC Research Group, Simple heuristics that make us smart. (pp. 3©34), and other chapters by Gigerenczer and Todd New York: Oxford University Press discussion of a variety of different simple heuristics and their effectiveness
Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (Eds.) (2001). Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox. Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press--comments on the concept of bounded rationality and those "fast and frugal" heuristics
Hastie, R., and Dawes, R. (2001). Rational choice in an uncertain world. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage--a good, readable introduction to judgment and decision making; see esp. Chapters 3-9
Klein, G. A. (1998). Sources of power. Chapters 16 ("Why good people make poor decisions") and 17 ("Conclusions"), pp. 271-293--an expansion of the ideas of naturalistic decision making
Newstead & Evans (1995)--a collection of chapters dealing with the various contributions of Peter Wason, including the rule discovery and the selection problem
Plous (1993)--another good, simple introduction to judgment and decision making
Roese & Olson (1995b)--a collection of chapters presenting research and theory on counterfactual reasoning.
Chapter 10
1. Briefly discuss in your own words the concept of situated cognition, as developed by Brown et al., Greeno, Lave, and others. What are the criticisms raised by these writers against traditional models of cognition and knowledge, and what are the more positive claims or assertions that they make? To what extent do you think that situated cognition represents a sustantive alternative to traditional cognitive psychology and education, as opposed to a set of mere critical observations? Finally, what were some of the criticisms of the situated cognition position itself raised by the author and other commentators? How would you evaluate the situated cognition viewpoint?
2. What is meant by the terms "cognitive apprenticeship" and "anchored cognition"? Why is there such a great emphasis in the situated cognition viewpoint on apprenticeships? What are some specific examples of these two concepts (i.e., cognitive apprenticeship and anchored instruction) in practice? How are these concepts opposed to or different from traditional approaches to instruction? How is all of this related to everyday cognition? What were some of the reservations expressed by the author regarding these concepts and practices?
3. What is meant by the terms "legitimate peripheral participation and "communities of practice"? What do these two concepts have in common, and how do they differ from the concept of situated cognition? What are the implications of these two concepts foreducation and learning in general? Briefly review, in your own words, the example of a community of practice given by Wenger, and then give one of your own. How would you evaluate the overall concepts of legitimate peripheral participation and communities of practice?
4. Briefly review in your own words the criticisms of situated cognition raised by Vera and Simon and by Anderson et al. To what extent do you think that these criticisms hit or miss the mark? What are some of the rebuttals provided by Agre and Suchman to Vera and Simon? Review the observations and reservations mentioned by the author. How would you evaluate the overall viewpoint and educational implications of situated cognition?
5. What is meant by the term "distributed cognition"? Give some examples from your own life of this concept (other than the ones mentioned in the text). In what ways is this concept similar to and different from the concept of situated cognition? What is the difference between the radical and conservative versions of distributed cognition? Finally, what are the reservations voiced by Nickerson with regard to the concept of distributed cognition?
6. What is it that makes a form of assessment "authentic," and what is the major criticism raised by advocates of authentic assessment against traditional approaches to assessment? How does authentic assessment relate to everyday cognition? Give some examples of authentic assessment (other than the concrete examples given in the text). That is, if you wanted to develop an authentic measure of some competency, how would you go about doing so? What are some of the criticisms of authentic assessment raised by Herman and Winters and by the present author? How would you evaluate the authentic assessment approach,in principle and in practice?
7. Briefly review in your own words the basic arguments raised Perkins along with his research findings regarding the limitations of everyday or informal reasoning. How are Perkins's results similar to and different from those presented by Voss and his associates? What were the reservations raised by the author about the Perkins et al. findings, and what findings were presented to support the author's position? Finally, what do you think is the most reasonable conclusion to be reached about the adequacy of everyday or informal reasoning?
8. Briefly review in your own words
Kuhn's view of reasoning as skilled
argumentation, as well as some of the evidence that she presents in support of this
viewpoint. What kinds of reasoning does Kuhn's argument focus
on, and how does this sort of reasoning differ from that
studied in the last section of this chapter? What does the author
see as the relationship between Kuhn's point of view and the
debate over rationality discussed in Chapter 9? What were some
of the reservations
raised by the author with regard to Kuhn's assumptions and research findings? In general, how
would you evaluate Kuhn's research?
9. Briefly review in your own words some of the research finding and general arguments made by Nisbett, Fong, and their associates about the effects of statistical and other forms of scientific and legal training on everyday reasoning. Why do Nisbett et al. believe that statistical training leads to better results than training in deductive reasoning, and how does this relate back to the discussion of rationality in Chapter 9? What do Nisbett et al. mean by the "codability hypothesis," and how does this hypothesis relate to the findings on statistical reasoning? How would you evaluate this research on statistical training?
10. Briefly indicate in your own words how the research and conceptualizations by Perkins et al., Kuhn, Nisbett et al., and Fischhoff derive from research and theory discussed in Chapter 9. What are the different forms of reasoning/judgment emphasized by these different theorists? How do you explain the different conclusions reached by Nisbett et al. and Fischhoff about the degree to which judgment biases can be "debiased"? To what extent do you think that everyday reasoning can be improved, and why?
11. In this chapter a couple of different positions have been presented regarding the quality or efficacy of everyday reasoning. (Note: I'm not referring to the improvement of everyday reasoning here, but rather the adequacy of reasoning in its ordinary, everyday form.) What are these two points of view, and how did different theorists come up with such different conclusions? How does this disagreement relate to the similar disagreement in Chapters 8 and 9? Does the latter disagreement help shed light on the former? Based on the material presented in this chapter, how would you evaluate the adequcy of everyday reasoning?
Identification:
References: Bell, P., & Winn, W. (2000). Distributed cognitions, by nature and by design. In D. H. Jonassen & S. M. Land (Eds.), Theoretical foundations of learning environments (pp. 123-145). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates--a reconsideration of distributed cognition
Kirshner, J. A., & Whitson, D. (1998).Obstacles to understanding cognition as situated. Educational Researcher 27(8). 22-28--a discussion of the difficulties in distinguishing between cognitive and situated approaches, including review of Anderson et al. (1997) and their critics
Kuhn (1991)--a detailed presentation of Kuhn's theory and research on informal reasoning, or Kuhn (1992) for a briefer presentation
Lave (1990)--most accessible presentation of Lave's viewpoint
Nisbett, R. (Ed.) (1993), Rules for reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.--a collection of several of the papers on the training of reasoning discussed in the text.
Voss, Perkins, & Segal (Eds.) (1991)-- a collection of papers on informal reasoning and education, including papers by Perkins et al., and by Voss et al.
Wenger (1998)--another accessible presentation of the situated cognition viewpoint
Chapter 11
1. Briefly review in your own words at least three of the seven models of everyday cognition discussed in Chapter 1, and develop fully at least two different applications of each of those models reviewed in the course of the text. Why do you think that the schema model is the one that has been most widely and frequently applied in research on everyday cognition? Which model, if any, do you think has the most potential for accounting for or making sense out of everyday thought?
2. Briefly discuss in your own words the general issue of abstract versus specific or concrete knowledge representations, and develop at least two theoretical and/or research examples of this debate or distinction. (In developing these examples, be sure and go back to the relevant chapters; don't just depend on the skeletal reviews in Chapter 12.) What are some advantages and some disadvantages of each of these forms of representation, and, according to the text. why is this distinction of particular importance in everyday cognition? In your opinion, which of these forms of representation predominates in our daily lives, or does that question really make sense?
3. Briefly discuss in your own words at least three of the conceptual themes that are common to the different topics reviewed in the text (or develop one or more of your own). What are some theoretical or research examples of these different themes? What are some everyday examples or translations of these conceptual issues, and why are these themes of some significance (or are they, in your opinion)?
4. Briefly review some of the alternative, non-experimental methods used in the study of everyday cognition. To what extent do yo think that these methods offer viable alternatives to traditional experimental psychology for the study of everyday cognition? How do current developments in statistical and computer modeling bear on this question? Which method (or combination of methods) do you think is best or most promising? What do you see as the place of laboratory research in the study of everyday thinking?
5. In Chapter 12 the author emphasizes the value of interdisciplinary approaches to everyday cognition. Give at least three examples of topics that have been approached from an interdisciplinary perspective, and specify what these different disciplines are and what their contributions are. What topics show this interdisciplinary emphasis? To what extent do you think that such an interdisciplinary approach is a plus or a minus, and why?
6. One of the questions raised by the various topics discussed in the text is the relative value of theory© or conceptually-based versus empirically based research. Give an example of each of these different approaches to research, and indicate which of these examples seems most productive to you? In general, which type of research, if either, seems most valuable to you? How do you think that future research on everyday cognition should proceed in this regard?
7. One of the main issues to be addressed in establishing a field or discipline of everyday cognition is how to achieve integration or coherence in that discipline. What are some of the ways reviewed in the text for establishing such coherence, and what are the limitations of each? Do you think it's really necessary or of value to establish an integrated discipline of everyday cognition?
8. Finally, how would you evaluate the study of everyday cognition? Do you think that there's value in distinguishing the study of everyday cognition from other areas of cognitive psychology or social cognition? Why or why not? Is the usual approach of treating everyday cognition as simply z set of applications of general laws of cognition or general cognitive processes preferable to the viewpoint advocated in this book? Which area or topic in everyday cognition do you think holds the most promise, and why?